"Tutzinger Thesen" as Online-Story-Tellingformat
SoSe 2012
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Re: relationship between unanimity and efficiency
- good question! there's two main possibilities: checking if such rules could have been consented to under some form of veil --> hypothetical contract or: we believe, like Hayek, in the survival of the best (efficient) norms by evolutionary approaches additionally, one can at least argue if there's not way of reforming the actual constitution with unanimous change, than Buchanan's check for constitutional efficiency means that it is efficient. that's discussed in the lecture, too
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Re: relationship between unanimity and efficiency
- your last interpretion is right. I'll say a few words on this in the next tutorial again, to make the point clearer. But so far: if there's unanimous agreement on a move from situation A to B, you know that this is a Pareto-improvement. Whether B is a Pareto-Optimum is not yet clear: only if there's no alternative (e.g. C) to be reached by additional Pareto-improvements, you are sure to be at a Pareto-efficient point. Unanimity ensures that we don't run into Pareto-inferior situation w.r.t. status quo, but it is not a sufficient criterion for arriving at a Pareto-Optimum.
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Re: relationship between unanimity and efficiency
- I had a question which is a bit similar to the previous one. If unanimity is the criteria of efficiency, then how are the existing constitutions evaluated for efficiency?
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relationship between unanimity and efficiency
- reviewing the tutorial slides i got a little confused because the notes differ from what i remember from the discussion during the last tutorial. question: can we say "unanimity must lead to an efficient outcome" or "for an outcome to be efficient it must be reached by unanimity" that is "unanimity can (but not must) lead to an efficient outcome"
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relationship between unanimity and efficiency
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language of exam
- Hallo, will the final exam be offered in a different language apart from English, e.g. in German? Thanks!
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Re: language of exam
- the exam questions will only be offered in English. Whether or not you are allowed to answer them in German or English is defined in your examination rules (Prüfungsordnung), we don't decide this on our own. But if I am not mistaken, students in German speaking programs are allowed to answer in German, too. But: In that case, you either entirely answer in German or in English, but must not mix the languages.
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language of exam
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Forum closed
- Due to a lack of discussion, this forum no longer will be supervised.
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Forum closed
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Constitutional Economics
- Discussion forum for Constitutional Economics, summer term 2011 (login and password will be announced in the tutorial)
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Re: Konfliktökonomik
- Die QQ-Kurve stellt die Grenzen der gemeinsamen Einkommenserzielungsmöglichkeiten dar. Statt auf Einkommen kann sich die Funktion auch auf generelle nutzenstiftende Möglichkeiten anwenden lassen. Die Möglichkeiten, Einkommen oder sonstige nutzenstiftende Ergebnisse zu erzielen, hängen generell von technischen Bedingungen ab, daher hängt das Aussehen dieser Kurve auch von technologischen Bedingungen ab, ist aber nicht mit der Transformationskurve gleichzusetzen.
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Konfliktökonomik
- Hallo, ich habe eine Frage zu den Schaubildern zur Konfliktökonomik: Was genau stellt die QQ-Kurve dar? Ist das einfach die Begrenzung der Ökonomie, also die Technologiemenge? Oder hat das eine ganz andere Bedeutung? Vielen Dank für die Hilfe!
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Konfliktökonomik
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Grundlagen der Wirtschaftspolitik (SoSe 2011)
- Diskussionsforum Grundlagen der Wirtschaftspolitik, SoSe 2011
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Veil of ignorance
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Veil of ignorance
- Hello Stefan, could you please explain me the following statement: "Potential conflict in constitutional interests is not eliminated, but the veil of ignorance transforms potential interpersonal conflicts into intrapersonal ones" (Vanberg,1994, p. 170). What I understood so far: The veil of ignorance/uncertainty is a hypothetical construction.If constitution-makers act as if they were behind a veil of uncertainty, society has the security that the rules of a consitution will not systematically privilege any specific group of the society. So what is the story with inter- and intrapersersonal conflicts? I don't get this distinction. Thanks so much, great tutorial by the way.
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Political Theory of Peace Studies and Conflict Management
- Information concerning the lecture "Political Theory of Peace Studies and Conflict Management" by Marcel Baumann in SoSe 2007.
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Public Sector Economics
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Public Sector Economics
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Hobbes-reading
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Hobbes-reading
- Hello Stefan, I am just a bit confused because some of Hobbes statements seem very extreme. So did I get him right? Hobbes strongly advocates to put all powers like executive, judicative, legislative in only one hand to ensure that the sovereignty is really strong enough to protect the individuals from eachother and from the attack of other countries. Even the control of the minds should be put in the hands of the souveranity. (So explicitly no seperation of powers and no freedom of speach) So Hobbes categorically refuses to put any restrictions on the souvereignty (or Leviathan), because nothing is worse than a Leviathan who cannot enforce property rights, because than society would drop back to Anarchy. And in Hobbes' opinion a very very cruel Leviathan is still better than a drop back to Anarchy. Thanks
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eppc1314tutorial6
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how can politicians survive
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how can politicians survive
- Sorry Stefan, one additional short question: in the Slide set #2 on page 10 is written that Constitutional Economics deals with the question :"How constitutions can be designed so that politicians who seek to serve public interest can survive" This is a bit surprising to me, because I thought that C.E. is mainly about determining suitable restrictions which hinder Leviathan to abuse his power. But why worring about his ability to survive if he acts in the public interest? Voters might appreciate his good intentions or not? Thanks
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Seminar: Introduction to Experimental Economics
- Information concerning the seminar "Introduction to Experimental Economics" by Dipl.-Vw. Nils Hesse in SoSe 2007.
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Foundations of Economic Policy (Tutorial)
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Regulation and Competition Policy
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Regulation and Competition Policy
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EPPC1314 Tutorial 8
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Forschungsfreisemester!
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Seminar “Basic Income and Social Justice”
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Seminar “Basic Income and Social Justice”
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Politische Ökonomie staatlicher Reformtätigkeit (Seminar)
- Informationen und Unterlagen zum Seminar im SoSe 2008.
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BISJ_Announcement
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BISJ_Announcement
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Political Economy of Conflict and Power (Seminar)
- Information concerning the seminar "Political Economy of Conflict and Power" by Prof. Neumärker in WS 2006/2007.
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Politische Ökonomie staatlicher Reformtätigkeit (Seminar)
- Informationen und Unterlagen zum Seminar von Prof. Neumärker "Politische Ökonomie staatlicher Reformtätigkeit" im SoSe 2006.
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[···]
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[···]
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REG 2019_Gliederung.pdf
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REG 2019_Gliederung.pdf
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Economic Policy and Public Choice
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REG 2019_Fol1-15.pdf
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REG 2019_Fol1-15.pdf
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Introduction Session
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Introduction Session
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eppc1314tutorial6
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Economic Policy and Public Choice
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Gliederung PSE
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Gliederung PSE
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Economic Policy and Public Choice
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EPPC1314 Tutorial 8
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Folien 1 PSE
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Folien 1 PSE
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Theorie wirtschaftspolitischer Reformen
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Theorie wirtschaftspolitischer Reformen
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Gliederung der Übung PSE
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Gliederung der Übung PSE
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Übung 1
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Übung 1
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REG 2019_Gliederung.pdf
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REG 2019_Gliederung.pdf
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Economics of Social Justice
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Economics of Social Justice
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OutlineOfTut_RG19_aktuell.pdf
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OutlineOfTut_RG19_aktuell.pdf
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RG_Üb1_Markt und effiziente Allokation.pdf
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RG_Üb1_Markt und effiziente Allokation.pdf
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RG_Üb1_Markt und effiziente Allokation.pdf
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RG_Üb1_Markt und effiziente Allokation.pdf
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Übung 2
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Übung 2
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RG_Üb2_Marktversagen.pdf
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RG_Üb2_Marktversagen.pdf
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SoSe 2010
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Übung 2
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Übung 2
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Übung 2 neu
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Übung 2 neu
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Erweriterter Teil 1 Vorlesung
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Erweriterter Teil 1 Vorlesung
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WS 2008/2009
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REG 2019_Fol1-30.pdf
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REG 2019_Fol1-30.pdf
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SoSe 2008
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Session Slides 1-6
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Session Slides 1-6
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WS 2007/2008
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REG 2019_Fol1-30_update.pdf
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REG 2019_Fol1-30_update.pdf
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Übung 3
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Übung 3
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RG_Üb3_Lösungsansätze bei Marktversagen.pdf
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RG_Üb3_Lösungsansätze bei Marktversagen.pdf
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SoSe 2006
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Übung 3.2
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Übung 3.2
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WS 2005/2006
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RG_Üb4_Ordoliberalismus.pdf