Constitutional Economics
Prof. Dr. Bernhard Neumärker
Institute for General Economic Research
Department for Economic Policy and Constitutional Economic Theory
Lecture
Time: Thu, 10-12 hrs. c.t.
Place: HS 2121
Tutorial
Time: Mon, 14-16 hrs. c.t.
Place: HS 2121
Supplementary Tutorials
Group | Tutors | Time | Place |
General | Wolf/Vöhringer | Mon, 18:15-19:45 | HS 1136 |
NBS | Wolf/Vöhringer | Wed, 16:15-17:45 | Breisacher Tor, HS 103 |
Start
Lecture: First semester week.
Tutorial: Second semester week.
Supplementary Tutorials: Third semester week.
Announcements
t.b.a.
Target Group
This course is designated for first-year student of the M.Sc. Economics program (economics and politics), the M.Sc. VWL program, Diploma-Students (Hauptstudium), and students of other faculties.
Credits
- M.Sc. Economics: Lecture and Tutorial for ‘Economics and Politics’ students: First-year course.
- M.Sc. VWL: “Volkswirtschaftspolitik (Ordnungspolitik)”
- Diploma students: Hauptstudium, Pflichtfach „Wirtschaftspolitik: Ordnungspolitik“, Pflichtwahlfach „Ordnungs- und Wettbewerbspolitik“.
Support
Stephan Wolf
Room: 2436
E-mail: stephan.wolf@vwl.uni-freiburg.de
Office hours: On appointment
Downloads
Lecture:
- Syllabus
- Slides Part I-II
- Slides Part III
Tutorial:
- Outline
- Tutorial 1
- Tutorial 2
- Tutorial 3
- Tutorial 4+5
- Tutorial 6
- Tutorial 7
- Tutorial 8
- Tutorial 9
- Tutorial 10
- Tutorial 11
- Tutorial 12
Supplementary Tutorial:
Outline and References
Outline
- Introduction
- The constitutional perspective in economics
- Constitutional and orthodox view of economics [3,4,6,8]
- The methodological hard core of constitutional analysis [4]
- Constitutional economics as a part of modern political economy [3,4,14]
- The logic of constitutional constraints [3,4,6,14]
- Constitutional design and constitutional reform [2,9,10,13]
- Constitutions as social contracts [10,12,13,14]
6.1 Explicit and implicit contracts
6.2 Complete and incomplete contracts - Normative and positive constitutional economics [1,4,9,11,13,15]
7.1 Emergence and stability of constitutions
7.2 Economic effects of constitutional rules
7.3 'Optimal' constitutions
- Applications
- Constitutional design of democratic institutions [1,7,10,14]
- Fiscal constitutions [3]
- Constitutional rules for market regulation [5,13]
- Constitutional change and rent-seeking [8,14]
- Economic policy consequences of constitutional arrangements [5,15]
References
- [1] Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J.A.: Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Cambridge 2006.
- [2] Bailey, M.J.: Constitution for a Future Country, Basingstoke et al. 2001.
- [3] Brennan, G., Buchanan, J. M.: The Power to Tax, Cambridge et al. 1980.
- [4] Brennan, G., Buchanan, J. M.: The Reason of Rules, Cambridge et al. 1985.
- [5] Buchanan, J. M.: The Domain of Constitutional Economics, in: Constitutional Political Economy, vol. 1, no. 1 (1990), 1-18.
- [6] Buchanan, J. M.: The Constitution of Economic Policy, in: American Economic Review 77 (1987), 243-250.
- [7] Buchanan, J. M.: The Limits of Liberty, Chicago 1975.
- [8] Buchanan, J.M., Tullock, G.: The Calculus of Consent, Ann Arbor 1962.
- [9] Caplin, A. S, Nalebuff, B. J.: On 64%-Majority Rule, in: Econometrica, vol. 56(4) (1988), 787-814.
- [10] Cooter, R.D.: The Strategic Constitution, Princeton/N.J. et al. 2000.
- [11] Dixit, A.K.: The Making of Economic Policy, Cambridge/Mass. 1996.
- [12] Gersbach, H.: Designing Democracy, Berlin et al. 2005.
- [13] Greif, A.: Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy, Cambridge 2006.
- [14] Hardin, R.: Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, Oxford 1999.
- [15] Laffont, J.-J.: Incentives and Political Economy, Oxford et al. 2000.
- [16] Maskin, E. S., Riley, J. G.: Monopoly with incomplete information, in: RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 15, issue 2 (1985), 171-196.
- [17] Mueller, D.C.: Public Choice III, Cambridge 2003.
- [18] Mueller, D.C.: Constitutional Public Choice, in: Perspectives on Public Choice, Cambridge 1997
- [19] Neumärker, K.J.B.: Some Analytical Foundations of Constitutional Public Finance, Manuscript, Freiburg 2009.
- [20] Neumärker, K.J.B.: Private Provision of Public Goods as Strategic Precommitment, Manuscript, Freiburg 2004.
- [21] Persson, T., Tabellini, G.: The Economic Effects of Constitutions, Cambridge/ Mass. 2003.
- [22] Salanié, B.: The Economics of Contracts, 2nd edition, Cambridge et al. 2005.
- [23] Tirole, J.: Incomplete Contracts: Where do we stand?, Econometrica, vol. 67, no. 4(1999), 741-781.
- [24] Voigt, S.: Positive constitutional economics: A survey, in: Public Choice 90 (1997), 11–53.
Supplementary articles will be announced.