« September 2021 »
September
MoTuWeThFrSaSu
12345
6789101112
13141516171819
20212223242526
27282930
Uni-Logo
You are here: Home Lehre Veranstaltungsarchiv SoSe 2012 Constitutional Economics
Document Actions

Constitutional Economics


Prof. Dr. Bernhard Neumärker

Institute for General Economic Research
Department for Economic Policy and Constitutional Economic Theory

 

Lecture

Time: Thu, 10-12 hrs. c.t.
Place: HS 2121

Tutorial

Time: Mon, 14-16 hrs. c.t.
Place: HS 2121

Supplementary Tutorials

Group
Tutors
Time
Place
GeneralWolf/VöhringerMon, 18:15-19:45HS 1136
NBSWolf/VöhringerWed, 16:15-17:45Breisacher Tor, HS 103

 

Start

Lecture: First semester week.
Tutorial: Second semester week.
Supplementary Tutorials: Third semester week.

Announcements

t.b.a.

Target Group

This course is designated for first-year student of the M.Sc. Economics program (economics and politics), the M.Sc. VWL program, Diploma-Students (Hauptstudium), and students of other faculties.

Credits

  • M.Sc. Economics: Lecture and Tutorial for ‘Economics and Politics’ students: First-year course.
  • M.Sc. VWL: “Volkswirtschaftspolitik (Ordnungspolitik)”
  • Diploma students: Hauptstudium, Pflichtfach „Wirtschaftspolitik: Ordnungspolitik“, Pflichtwahlfach „Ordnungs- und Wettbewerbspolitik“.

Support

Stephan Wolf
Room: 2436
E-mail: stephan.wolf@vwl.uni-freiburg.de
Office hours: On appointment

Downloads

Lecture:

Tutorial:

Supplementary Tutorial:

Outline and References

Outline

  1. Introduction
  2. The constitutional perspective in economics
    1. Constitutional and orthodox view of economics [3,4,6,8]
    2. The methodological hard core of constitutional analysis [4]
    3. Constitutional economics as a part of modern political economy [3,4,14]
    4. The logic of constitutional constraints [3,4,6,14]
    5. Constitutional design and constitutional reform [2,9,10,13]
    6. Constitutions as social contracts [10,12,13,14]
      6.1 Explicit and implicit contracts
      6.2 Complete and incomplete contracts
    7. Normative and positive constitutional economics [1,4,9,11,13,15]
      7.1 Emergence and stability of constitutions
      7.2 Economic effects of constitutional rules
      7.3 'Optimal' constitutions
  3. Applications
    1. Constitutional design of democratic institutions [1,7,10,14]
    2. Fiscal constitutions [3]
    3. Constitutional rules for market regulation [5,13]
    4. Constitutional change and rent-seeking [8,14]
    5. Economic policy consequences of constitutional arrangements [5,15]

References

  • [1] Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J.A.: Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Cambridge 2006.
  • [2] Bailey, M.J.: Constitution for a Future Country, Basingstoke et al. 2001.
  • [3] Brennan, G., Buchanan, J. M.: The Power to Tax, Cambridge et al. 1980.
  • [4] Brennan, G., Buchanan, J. M.: The Reason of Rules, Cambridge et al. 1985.
  • [5] Buchanan, J. M.: The Domain of Constitutional Economics, in: Constitutional Political Economy, vol. 1, no. 1 (1990), 1-18.
  • [6] Buchanan, J. M.: The Constitution of Economic Policy, in: American Economic Review 77 (1987), 243-250.
  • [7] Buchanan, J. M.: The Limits of Liberty, Chicago 1975.
  • [8] Buchanan, J.M., Tullock, G.: The Calculus of Consent, Ann Arbor 1962.
  • [9] Caplin, A. S, Nalebuff, B. J.: On 64%-Majority Rule, in: Econometrica, vol. 56(4) (1988), 787-814.
  • [10] Cooter, R.D.: The Strategic Constitution, Princeton/N.J. et al. 2000.
  • [11] Dixit, A.K.: The Making of Economic Policy, Cambridge/Mass. 1996.
  • [12] Gersbach, H.: Designing Democracy, Berlin et al. 2005.
  • [13] Greif, A.: Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy, Cambridge 2006.
  • [14] Hardin, R.: Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, Oxford 1999.
  • [15] Laffont, J.-J.: Incentives and Political Economy, Oxford et al. 2000.
  • [16] Maskin, E. S., Riley, J. G.: Monopoly with incomplete information, in: RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 15, issue 2 (1985), 171-196.
  • [17] Mueller, D.C.: Public Choice III, Cambridge 2003.
  • [18] Mueller, D.C.: Constitutional Public Choice, in: Perspectives on Public Choice, Cambridge 1997
  • [19] Neumärker, K.J.B.: Some Analytical Foundations of Constitutional Public Finance, Manuscript, Freiburg 2009.
  • [20] Neumärker, K.J.B.: Private Provision of Public Goods as Strategic Precommitment, Manuscript, Freiburg 2004.
  • [21] Persson, T., Tabellini, G.: The Economic Effects of Constitutions, Cambridge/ Mass. 2003.
  • [22] Salanié, B.: The Economics of Contracts, 2nd edition, Cambridge et al. 2005.
  • [23] Tirole, J.: Incomplete Contracts: Where do we stand?, Econometrica, vol. 67, no. 4(1999), 741-781.
  • [24] Voigt, S.: Positive constitutional economics: A survey, in: Public Choice 90 (1997), 11–53.

 

Supplementary articles will be announced.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Personal tools