Constitutional Economics
Information and documents concerning the course "Constitutional Economics" in Summer Term 2011.
Prof. Dr. Bernhard Neumärker
Institute for General Economic Research
Section for Economic Policy and Constitutional Economic Theory
Lecture
Time: Thu, 8-10 hrs. c.t.
Place: Room 3042
Tutorial
Time: Mon, 14-16 hrs. c.t.
Place: Room 3043
Supplementary Tutorials
Tutor: Nicolas Weinhold, philosophyandeconomics |at| gmail.com
- General Group: Wed 12-14 hrs. c.t., Breisacher Tor R 104
- NBS Group: Wed 16-18 hrs. c.t., Room 1036
Start
Lecture: First semester week.
Tutorial: Second semester week.
Supplementary Tutorials: Third semester week.
Announcements
Lecture/tutorial swap
- Second week of June: lecture takes place on Mon, June 6, and tutorial on Thu, June 9.
Target Group
This course is designated for first-year IMP-Students (Master of Economics and Politics), Diploma-Students (Hauptstudium) and students of other faculties (Magister).
Credits
IMP, Diploma (creditable to Pflichtfach "Wirtschaftspolitik: Ordnungspolitik" and Pflichtwahlfach "Ordnungs- und Wettbewerbspolitik") and other students: 6 Credit Points (exam including tutorial).
Support
Stephan Wolf
Room: 2436
E-mail: stephan.wolf@vwl.uni-freiburg.de
Office hours: On appointment
Discussion Forum
There is also a discussion forum on the course content moderated by Stephan Wolf.
Downloads
Lecture:
- Syllabus
- Slides Part I-II
- Slides Part III
Tutorial:
- Outline
- Tutorial 1
- Tutorial 2
- Tutorial 3
- Tutorial 4 (completed version)
- Tutorial 5
- Tutorial 6
- Tutorial 7
- Tutorial 8
- Tutorial 9
- Tutorial 10
- Tutorial 11
- Questions for Exam Preparation
Supplementary Tutorial:
Outline and References
Outline
- Introduction
- The constitutional perspective in economics
- Constitutional and orthodox view of economics [3,4,6,8]
- The methodological hard core of constitutional analysis [4]
- Constitutional economics as a part of modern political economy [3,4,14]
- The logic of constitutional constraints [3,4,6,14]
- Constitutional design and constitutional reform [2,9,10,13]
- Constitutions as social contracts [10,12,13,14]
6.1 Explicit and implicit contracts
6.2 Complete and incomplete contracts - Normative and positive constitutional economics [1,4,9,11,13,15]
7.1 Emergence and stability of constitutions
7.2 Economic effects of constitutional rules
7.3 'Optimal' constitutions
- Applications
- Constitutional design of democratic institutions [1,7,10,14]
- Fiscal constitutions [3]
- Constitutional rules for market regulation [5,13]
- Constitutional change and rent-seeking [8,14]
- Economic policy consequences of constitutional arrangements [5,15]
References
- [1] Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J.A.: Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Cambridge 2006.
- [2] Bailey, M.J.: Constitution for a Future Country, Basingstoke et al. 2001.
- [3] Brennan, G., Buchanan, J. M.: The Power to Tax, Cambridge et al. 1980.
- [4] Brennan, G., Buchanan, J. M.: The Reason of Rules, Cambridge et al. 1985.
- [5] Buchanan, J. M.: The Domain of Constitutional Economics, in: Constitutional Political Economy, vol. 1, no. 1 (1990), 1-18.
- [6] Buchanan, J. M.: The Constitution of Economic Policy, in: American Economic Review 77 (1987), 243-250.
- [7] Buchanan, J. M.: The Limits of Liberty, Chicago 1975.
- [8] Buchanan, J.M., Tullock, G.: The Calculus of Consent, Ann Arbor 1962.
- [9] Caplin, A. S, Nalebuff, B. J.: On 64%-Majority Rule, in: Econometrica, vol. 56(4) (1988), 787-814.
- [10] Cooter, R.D.: The Strategic Constitution, Princeton/N.J. et al. 2000.
- [11] Dixit, A.K.: The Making of Economic Policy, Cambridge/Mass. 1996.
- [12] Gersbach, H.: Designing Democracy, Berlin et al. 2005.
- [13] Greif, A.: Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy, Cambridge 2006.
- [14] Hardin, R.: Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, Oxford 1999.
- [15] Laffont, J.-J.: Incentives and Political Economy, Oxford et al. 2000.
- [16] Maskin, E. S., Riley, J. G.: Monopoly with incomplete information, in: RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 15, issue 2 (1985), 171-196.
- [17] Mueller, D.C.: Public Choice III, Cambridge 2003.
- [18] Mueller, D.C.: Constitutional Public Choice, in: Perspectives on Public Choice, Cambridge 1997
- [19] Neumärker, K.J.B.: Some Analytical Foundations of Constitutional Public Finance, Manuscript, Freiburg 2009.
- [20] Neumärker, K.J.B.: Private Provision of Public Goods as Strategic Precommitment, Manuscript, Freiburg 2004.
- [21] Persson, T., Tabellini, G.: The Economic Effects of Constitutions, Cambridge/ Mass. 2003.
- [22] Salanié, B.: The Economics of Contracts, 2nd edition, Cambridge et al. 2005.
- [23] Tirole, J.: Incomplete Contracts: Where do we stand?, Econometrica, vol. 67, no. 4(1999), 741-781.
- [24] Voigt, S.: Positive constitutional economics: A survey, in: Public Choice 90 (1997), 11–53.
Supplementary articles will be announced.