Constitutional Economics
Lecture in Summer Semester 2014
Constitutional Economics
Prof. Dr. Bernhard Neumärker
Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg
Department for Economic Policy and Constitutional Economic Theory
Schedule
Lecture: Prof. Dr. Bernhard Neumärker
Time: | Thurs, 10-12 hrs. |
Room: | HS 2121 KG II |
Start: | 2. Semester week |
Tutorial: Dipl.-Volksw. Christoph Oberlack
Time: | Tues, 14-16 hrs. |
Room: | HS 2, Alte Uni |
Start: | 3. Semester week |
Supplementary Tutorials: Mihaela Pavlova & Matthew Bonick
General: | Thurs, 14-16 hrs., HS 3042 |
NBS: | Mon, 12-14 hrs., Universitätsstr. 5, room 1 |
Start: | 4. Semester week |
Target Group and Language
- This course is designated for first-year students of the M.Sc. Economics program (economics and politics), the M.Sc. VWL program, and Diplom-Students (Hauptstudium). Exchange students are equally welcome to participate.
- If students of other faculties (e.g. political science) wish to participate, they should contact the tutor by email before the third week of the semester.
- Recommended prerequisites: Good knowledge of microeconomics and of the course "Economic Policy and Public Choice".
- This module is entirely taught in English.
Credits: 6 ECTS
- M.Sc. Economics: First-year course for profile ‘Economics and Politics’.
- M.Sc. VWL: Wirtschaftspolitisches Wahlpflichtmodul (Ordnungspolitik).
- Diplom VWL: Hauptstudium, Pflichtfach „Wirtschaftspolitik: Ordnungspolitik“, Pflichtwahlfach „Ordnungs- und Wettbewerbspolitik“.
Tutor
Christoph Oberlack, Room: 2436 KG II
E-mail: christoph.oberlack AT vwl.uni-freiburg.de
Office hours: On appointment
Downloads
- Outlines and slides are provided at this website.
- Literature will be provided on ILIAS.
- The passwords will be provided in the first lecture (May 8, 2014) and tutorial (May 13, 2014).
Lecture:
Tutorial:
- Tutorial Outline (Update: July 29, 2014)
- Slides 01 (Introduction to the Constitutional Economics tutorial)
- Slides 02 (Justifying state institutions - from anarchy to social contract)
- Slides 03 (Freiburg school of economics and the calculus of consent)
- Slides 04 (Institutions of democracy and economic performance)
- Slides 05 (Polycentricity and self-organization)
- Slides 06 (Governance institutions and the feasibility of reforms)
- Slides 07 (Exam preparation)
- Slides 08 (The public debt crisis in Europe in constitutional perspective)
- Session 09 (Resource Curse Game - no slides for download)
- Session 10 (The Ukraine crisis from constitutional perspective - no slides for download)
- Slides 11 (Review, summary, exam hints)
Sub-Tutorial:
Outline
- Introduction
- The constitutional perspective in economics
- Constitutional and orthodox view of economics [3,4,6]
- The methodological hard core of constitutional analysis [4,5]
- Constitutional economics as a part of modern political economy [11,24]
- The logic of constitutional constraints [3,5]
- Constitutional design and constitutional reform [2,4,12,15,19,22]
- Constitutions as social contracts
6.1 Explicit and implicit contracts [17,19]
6.2 Complete and incomplete contracts [11,15,19,23] - Normative and positive constitutional economics
7.1 Emergence and stability of constitutions [1,14,17,18,20, 25]
7.2 Economic effects of constitutional rules [21,24]
7.3 'Optimal' constitutions [12,17,19]
- Applications
- Constitutional design of democratic institutions [1,8,12,17,25]
- Fiscal constitutions [3,16,19, 26]
- Constitutional rules for market regulation [6,15]
- Constitutional change and rent-seeking [10,17]
- Economic policy consequences of constitutional arrangements [6,10,21]
References
- [1] Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J.A.: Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Cambridge 2006.
- [2] Bailey, M.J.: Constitution for a Future Country, Basingstoke et al. 2001.
- [3] Brennan, G., Buchanan, J. M.: The Power to Tax, Cambridge et al. 1980.
- [4] Brennan, G., Buchanan, J. M.: The Reason of Rules, Cambridge et al. 1985.
- [5] Buchanan, J. M.: The Domain of Constitutional Economics, in: Constitutional Political Economy, vol. 1, no. 1 (1990), 1-18.
- [6] Buchanan, J. M.: The Constitution of Economic Policy, in: American Economic Review 77 (1987), 243-250.
- [7] Buchanan, J. M.: The Limits of Liberty, Chicago 1975.
- [8] Buchanan, J.M., Tullock, G.: The Calculus of Consent, Ann Arbor 1962.
- [9] Caplin, A. S, Nalebuff, B. J.: On 64%-Majority Rule, in: Econometrica, vol. 56(4) (1988), 787-814.
- [10] Cooter, R.D.: The Strategic Constitution, Princeton/N.J. et al. 2000.
- [11] Dixit, A.K.: The Making of Economic Policy, Cambridge/Mass. 1996.
- [12] Gersbach, H.: Designing Democracy, Berlin et al. 2005.
- [13] Greif, A.: Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy, Cambridge 2006.
- [14] Hardin, R.: Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, Oxford 1999.
- [15] Laffont, J.-J.: Incentives and Political Economy, Oxford et al. 2000.
- [16] Maskin, E. S., Riley, J. G.: Monopoly with incomplete information, in: RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 15, issue 2 (1985), 171-196.
- [17] Mueller, D.C.: Public Choice III, Cambridge 2003.
- [18] Mueller, D.C.: Constitutional Public Choice, in: Perspectives on Public Choice, Cambridge 1997.
- [19] Neumärker, K.J.B.: Some Analytical Foundations of Constitutional Public Finance, Manuscript, Freiburg 2009.
- [20] Neumärker, K.J.B.: Private Provision of Public Goods as Strategic Precommitment, Manuscript, Freiburg 2004.
- [21] Persson, T., Tabellini, G.: The Economic Effects of Constitutions, Cambridge/ Mass. 2003.
- [22] Salanié, B.: The Economics of Contracts, Cambridge et al. 2005, 2nd edition.
- [23] Tirole, J.: Incomplete Contracts: Where do we stand?, Econometrica, vol. 67, no. 4 (1999), 741-781.
- [24] Voigt, S.: Positive constitutional economics: A survey, in: Public Choice 90 (1997), 11–53.
- [25] Voigt, S. (Ed.): Design of Constitutions. Cheltenham/Northampton 2013.
- [26] Wagner, R.E.: Deficit, debt, and democracy. Wrestling with Tragedy of the Fiscal Commons. Cheltenham/Northampton 2012.
Supplementary articles will be announced in the lecture and tutorial.