WS 2008/2009

Re: relationship between unanimity and efficiency

good question! there's two main possibilities: checking if such rules could have been consented to under some form of veil --> hypothetical contract or: we believe, like Hayek, in the survival of the best (efficient) norms by evolutionary approaches additionally, one can at least argue if there's not way of reforming the actual constitution with unanimous change, than Buchanan's check for constitutional efficiency means that it is efficient. that's discussed in the lecture, too

Re: relationship between unanimity and efficiency

your last interpretion is right. I'll say a few words on this in the next tutorial again, to make the point clearer. But so far: if there's unanimous agreement on a move from situation A to B, you know that this is a Pareto-improvement. Whether B is a Pareto-Optimum is not yet clear: only if there's no alternative (e.g. C) to be reached by additional Pareto-improvements, you are sure to be at a Pareto-efficient point. Unanimity ensures that we don't run into Pareto-inferior situation w.r.t. status quo, but it is not a sufficient criterion for arriving at a Pareto-Optimum.

Re: relationship between unanimity and efficiency

I had a question which is a bit similar to the previous one. If unanimity is the criteria of efficiency, then how are the existing constitutions evaluated for efficiency?

relationship between unanimity and efficiency

reviewing the tutorial slides i got a little confused because the notes differ from what i remember from the discussion during the last tutorial. question: can we say "unanimity must lead to an efficient outcome" or "for an outcome to be efficient it must be reached by unanimity" that is "unanimity can (but not must) lead to an efficient outcome"

relationship between unanimity and efficiency

 

language of exam

Hallo, will the final exam be offered in a different language apart from English, e.g. in German? Thanks!

Re: language of exam

the exam questions will only be offered in English. Whether or not you are allowed to answer them in German or English is defined in your examination rules (Prüfungsordnung), we don't decide this on our own. But if I am not mistaken, students in German speaking programs are allowed to answer in German, too. But: In that case, you either entirely answer in German or in English, but must not mix the languages.        

language of exam

 

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Constitutional Economics

Discussion forum for Constitutional Economics, summer term 2011 (login and password will be announced in the tutorial)

Veil of ignorance

 

Veil of ignorance

Hello Stefan, could you please explain me the following statement: "Potential conflict in constitutional interests is not eliminated, but the veil of ignorance transforms potential interpersonal conflicts into intrapersonal ones" (Vanberg,1994, p. 170). What I understood so far: The veil of ignorance/uncertainty is a hypothetical construction.If constitution-makers act as if they were behind a veil of uncertainty, society has the security that the rules of a consitution will not systematically privilege any specific group of the society. So what is the story with inter- and intrapersersonal conflicts? I don't get this distinction. Thanks so much, great tutorial by the way.

Hobbes-reading

 

Hobbes-reading

Hello Stefan, I am just a bit confused because some of Hobbes statements seem very extreme. So did I get him right? Hobbes strongly advocates to put all powers like executive, judicative, legislative in only one hand to ensure that the sovereignty is really strong enough to protect the individuals from eachother and from the attack of other countries. Even the control of the minds should be put in the hands of the souveranity. (So explicitly no seperation of powers and no freedom of speach) So Hobbes categorically refuses to put any restrictions on the souvereignty (or Leviathan), because nothing is worse than a Leviathan who cannot enforce property rights, because than society would drop back to Anarchy. And in Hobbes' opinion a very very cruel Leviathan is still better than a drop back to Anarchy. Thanks

how can politicians survive

 

how can politicians survive

Sorry Stefan, one additional short question: in the Slide set #2 on page 10 is written that Constitutional Economics deals with the question :"How constitutions can be designed so that politicians who seek to serve public interest can survive" This is a bit surprising to me, because I thought that C.E. is mainly about determining suitable restrictions which hinder Leviathan to abuse his power. But why worring about his ability to survive if he acts in the public interest? Voters might appreciate his good intentions or not? Thanks