## **Constitutional Economics**

#### I Introduction

## II The constitutional perspective in economics

- 1 Constitutional and orthodox view of economics [3,4,6,8]
- 2 The methodological hard core of constitutional analysis [4]
- Constitutional economics as a part of modern political economy [3,4,14]
- 4 The logic of constitutional constraints [3,4,6,14]
- 5 Constitutional design and constitutional reform [2,9,10,13]
- 6 Constitutions as social contracts [10,12,13,14]
  - 6.1 Explicit and implicit contracts
  - 6.2 Complete and incomplete contracts
- 7 Normative and positive constitutional economics [1,4,9,11,13,15]
  - 7.1 Emergence and stability of constitutions
  - 7.2 Economic effects of constitutional rules
  - 7.3 'Optimal' constitutions

# III Applications

- 1 Constitutional design of democratic institutions [1,7,10,14]
- 2 Fiscal constitutions [3]
- 3 Constitutional rules for market regulation [5,13]
- 4 Constitutional change and rent-seeking [8,14]
- 5 Economic policy consequences of constitutional arrangements [5,15]

#### References

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Supplementary articles will be announced.